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Abstract∗ 
Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international 
organizations? This paper demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion 
even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European 
Union’s primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that 
domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique 
dataset on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments 
are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority 
when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are 
more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our 
findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their 
responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.  
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Government responsiveness to public opinion is central to democratic representation. It implies 
that elected representatives are listening to and acting upon the wishes and views of the 
represented (see e.g. Mansbridge 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Various studies have shown 
that policy agendas, government spending and legislative voting follow the changing policy 
preferences of citizens (Page and Shapiro 1983; 1992; Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995; 
Wlezien 1995; Lax and Philips 2012). The fear of electoral sanctioning is a primary incentive for 
governments to act responsively. Not surprisingly, studies have therefore found that in systems 
of low clarity of responsibility and limited information, where it is difficult for voters to identify 
policy shirking, elected representatives are also less responsive to public preferences (see Besley 
and Burgess 2002; Carey 2008; Snyder and Strömberg 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). On the 
one hand, we may expect governments to be less concerned about responding to public 
preferences when legislating in international organizations (IOs) where clarity of responsibility is 
blurred by multilevel structures and public scrutiny is generally less pronounced.1 On the other 
hand, increased transparency and scrutiny of decision-making in some international 
organizations may give governments greater incentives to use this arena to signal that they are 
aligned with the public’s views and preferences. 
 Yet, little evidence exists with regards to whether governments are in fact responsive to 
domestic public opinion pressures when acting in international organizations. While public 
opinion is generally seen as an important factor explaining government behavior in the domestic 
context, the empirical literature on the role of public opinion in IOs is still sparse (see Stasavage 
2004). Instead, studies of government behavior in IOs have mainly focused on other drivers, 
                                               
1
 For discussions of transparency in international organizations see e.g. Keohane (2002), Risse (2000), Stasavage 
(2004). 
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such as geopolitics, military and economic resources, and special interest preferences (see e.g. 
Bailey et al 2015; Dreher and Sturm 2012; Bailer, Mattila and Schneider 2014). The contribution 
of this study is to focus on the role of public opinion in shaping government behavior in the 
European Union (EU) to understand if and when governments use the international arena to 
signal to their domestic electorates. We argue that domestic electoral incentives can compel 
governments to signal that they are responsive to public opinion even when acting 
internationally. 
Our empirical investigation focuses on decision-making in the EU). The EU is arguably 
the world’s most advanced IO, presiding over a level of economic and political integration 
unmatched in global politics. We examine government behavior in its primary decision-making 
body, the Council of the European Union (henceforward, the Council), where national ministers 
negotiate and adopt legislative proposals. Legislative bargaining in the Council used to take 
place behind closed doors, however since 1999 an increasing amount of information on policy 
decisions and government positions has become available (Naurin and Wallace 2008). In this 
paper, we analyze a unique dataset covering all legislative acts since 1999 and investigate to 
what extent government opposition in the Council is a response to popular opposition to 
European integration. Government opposition in the Council is still a rare event, but one that 
carries considerable significance (Mattila 2009; Novak 2013). Our argument is that when 
domestic electorates hold unfavorable views on European integration, governments can 
strategically oppose EU acts that are concerned with further transfers of authority to the EU to 
demonstrate that their position is aligned with their public’s preferences.  Hence, in contrast to 
the extant wisdom that governments are shielded from public opinion when legislating 
internationally, we argue that popular Euroskepticism incentivizes them to voice opposition in 
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the Council. While this is not “policy responsiveness” in the classic sense of changing the overall 
policy direction of the Council, we conceptualize it as “signal responsiveness” that serves to 
communicate governments’ positions to their domestic electorate.  
Our findings demonstrate that governments’ opposition to legislative proposals is indeed 
shaped by public opinion on European integration wherever these proposals extend the level and 
scope of European integration. We also find that governments are more likely to signal their 
positions in the Council when the issue gains importance in domestic party competition and that 
these signals resonate in the national public sphere. Our findings thus contribute not only to our 
understanding of policy-making in the EU, but may also have broader significance as IOs 
increasingly face pressures to deepen cooperation and increase transparency and accountability 
to domestic audiences. Moreover, our study enhances our understanding of democratic 
responsiveness by highlighting that governments use the international stage to signal to voters at 
home that they care about their views. 
   
  
Government Responsiveness in International Organizations 
The relationship between public preferences and government policy is at the heart of theories of 
democratic representation. There is a rich literature on government responsiveness; if, when and 
how government policies respond to changes in public opinion (see e.g. Wlezien 1995; Erikson 
et al. 2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).2 Despite the scholarly 
                                               
2
 The relationship between public opinion and government policy is, however, complex. Studies have stressed 
governments’ ability to manipulate opinion (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), raised questions on who comprises the 
relevant ‘public’ (e.g. Gilens 2012), and highlighted the complex relationship between responsiveness and 
congruence (e.g. Lax and Philips 2012). 
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focus on how public opinion shapes government positions and policies when they act 
domestically,3 far less attention has been paid to how public opinion influences government 
behavior in IOs. Overwhelmingly, the literature on government positions and legislative 
behavior in IOs, such as the EU, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations, has 
focused on military and economic considerations, and special interests as drivers of government 
behavior (see e.g. Hug and Lukcas 2013; Dreher and Sturm 2012; Bailey et al. 2014). This is 
also true of the literature on government behavior in the Council more specifically.  
 Numerous studies have in recent years examined decision-making in the Council, not 
least due to improved public access to information. Yet, none of these have provided a rigorous 
study of how public opinion may shape government behavior. Instead, the literature has centered 
on economic interests and government ideology as drivers of behavior. A recent example is 
Bailer, Mattila and Schneider’s (2014) study of voting behavior in the Council, who demonstrate 
that government opposition can largely be attributed to economic explanations, notably domestic 
specialized interests. Others have found that a North-South divide exists between the member 
states in their voting patterns (Mattila 2009; Thomson et al. 2006) or that the left-right ideology 
of governments matters to their behavior in the Council (Hagemann 2008; Hagemann and 
Høyland 2008; Mattila 2009). The general assumption in this work is that as governments are 
largely insulated from electoral pressures when they legislate in the Council, constituency 
demands do not play a significant role. As Bailer et al. (2014: 8-9) note: 
[E]lectorates are usually not well informed about the Council deliberations because 
these negotiations are conducted mostly away from the public scrutiny behind the 
                                               
3
 Some studies have also examined the impact of public opinion on politicians’ foreign policy positions, see e.g. 
Milner and Tingley (2011) and Jacobs and Page (2005). 
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“closed doors” (…) Therefore, negative votes and abstentions in the Council 
protocol will be a signal to which mainly domestic interest groups pay some 
attention. 
  
Public opinion is not entirely absent from the literature on EU policy-making, however.  Some 
studies have examined “systemic responsiveness” by analyzing whether the amount of 
legislation passed reflects public demands for further integration, showing a relationship between 
EU support and the amount of legislation (see Toshkov 2011; De Vries and Arnold 2011; 
Arnold, Franklin and Wlezien 2013). While this work is valuable for studying responsiveness at 
the system level, it provides limited insights into when and why we would expect individual 
politicians to act responsively in the EU. Moreover, it is based on the strong assumption that 
more legislative acts necessarily imply more integration. 
         In contrast to extant work on systemic responsiveness, we examine the micro-foundations 
of responsiveness by analyzing government behavior in the Council. If there is any relationship 
between public opinion and government behavior in IOs, we would expect to find it in the EU, as 
arguably the world’s most advanced IO with high levels of political and economic integration 
and increasing salience in domestic public spheres (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Hence, we cannot 
easily generalize from the EU to other IOs. Yet, as a ‘most likely case’ the EU is an important 
starting point for the exploration of democratic responsiveness in the international arena. 
 The Council is the EU’s primary legislative chamber,4 and we focus on government 
opposition to legislative acts. While the majority of acts adopted by the Council are supported by 
                                               
4 Legally speaking the Council is one entity, but in practice it is divided into 10 configurations (Competitiveness; 
Economic & Financial Affairs; etc.) and each Council has to adopt legislation according to a set of rules depending 
on the legal basis of the policy proposal in question.  
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all member states, opposition in the Council has increased during the past 10-15 years, with more 
legislation now adopted with either a single or a number of governments explicitly recording 
their disagreement (Naurin and Wallace 2008). Today, “vote intentions” are publicly available 
ahead of Council meetings, and minutes and final legislative records from the meetings include 
information about votes and policy positions by the member states. Council votes are also 
reported more widely by national media (see below). In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, this 
study develops and tests the argument that public opinion can play a role in shaping 
governments’ behavior in the Council. 
 
 
Responsive Opposition in the Council 
How would responsiveness to public opinion manifest itself in governments’ voting behavior in 
the Council? We argue that governments can use opposition votes in the Council as public 
signals of their position on EU integration. This signal responsiveness is different from 
substantive responsiveness in that governments cannot directly change the policy substance with 
their opposition (since all acts put to a vote eventually pass), but they can use it as a 
communication tool to credibly signal their position on transfers of authority (closer European 
integration) to a wider audience. However, governments’ motivations to signal their position are 
similar to when they change policies in line with public opinion during the legislative term: in 
both cases it is a form of “anticipatory representation” as they focus on what they think voters 
will reward in the next election rather than what they promised during the campaign of the 
previous election (Mansbridge 2003; see also Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995; Erikson et 
al. 2002). Crucially, however, the EU makes it more difficult for a single government to shift 
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actual policy in line with domestic preferences. Yet, by voting in line with public preferences 
they are still able to send the signal that they are not out of step with the public mood.   
Recent studies have shown that citizens care about government responsiveness (see X 
2015; XXX 2015), and the issue of European integration has become increasingly salient to 
voters. Since the early 1990s, Europe has witnessed a shift away from a “permissive consensus” 
in favor of elite-led European integration towards more vocal and skeptical public attitudes 
towards the integration project, so-called Euroskepticism (see e.g. see De Vries 2007; Hooghe 
and Marks 2009; De Vries and Hobolt 2014). The electoral consequences of Euroskepticism 
have been acutely felt by Europe’s mainstream parties as they suffered loss of support due to the 
rise of Euroskeptic parties, mainly on the far right and the far left, both in national and European 
Parliament elections (see De Vries 2007; Hobolt and Spoon 2012). Hence, given the increasing 
salience of voters’ concerns on European integration in deciding electoral contests, political 
elites have been looking for ways of adjusting their position on the issue.  
We argue that Council voting serves as a signaling tool that governments may adopt to 
communicate their positions on a given proposal, and on European integration more generally, to 
a domestic audience. Given the strong consensus culture in the Council, opposition sends a clear, 
and generally unwelcome, message to negotiation partners that may be costly in terms of 
reputation and related future negotiation success (see Naurin and Wallace 2008; Novak 2013; 
UK House of Commons 2013). Opposition can also have immediate consequences as it may lead 
to dismissal of the opposing government’s preferences when drafting the final policy text. 
Hence, as there are few benefits (the policy will be passed by the majority in any case) and 
several costs, it is not surprising that opposition is still relative rare, accounting for less than 2 
percent of votes during the 1999-2011 period we investigate here. This means, however, that as a 
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public signalling tool opposition votes can be seen as more credible as they involve “observable 
costly effort” (see Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
However, in order to serve as a public signal of the government’s position on integration, 
an opposition vote must be interpretable as a stance against European integration. Most of the 
legislative proposals in the Council, however, do not relate to transfers of authority to the EU 
level. Some policy areas, such as Agriculture, deal primarily with rather technical amendments 
or issues in the remit of already established EU competences, whereas other policy areas are 
concerned with extending the scope of authority by establishing EU legislation or programs in 
previously unaffected areas as well as its level by delegating new decisional powers to 
supranational bodies or agencies (Schmitter 1970; Boerzel 2005). Our expectation is therefore 
that opposition that is aimed at appeasing public concerns about European integration will 
primarily relate to votes in policy areas concerned with extending the level or scope of EU 
authority. This leads to our first hypothesis concerning government responsiveness in the 
Council: 
  
H1: Governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that affect the authority of the 
EU when domestic public opinion is negatively disposed towards the EU than when public 
opinion is positively disposed towards the EU. 
  
The extent to which governments wish to use opposition votes as a signal to their publics 
is also shaped by domestic political competition. We expect that governments’ responsiveness is 
higher when the issue of European integration is salient in the domestic context. Since signal 
responsiveness aims at communicating positions (and shifts in positions) to the public, it 
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becomes largely obsolete in situations when conflicts about integration are not politicized in the 
domestic political arena. Political elites play a crucial role in mobilizing a new issue in the 
domestic public sphere, including in the media, and thus making it relevant to voters’ choices 
(see Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; Hooghe and Marks 2009). The abstract nature of 
European integration and multilevel governance issues makes the actions of political elites all the 
more important, since such issues typically lack inherent news value (Soroka 2002). Instead, it is 
political elites’ communication activities on these issues that render them newsworthy in the first 
place (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013). In turn, increased levels of (media) information 
on EU integration render the issue more important for electoral competition as they facilitate 
“EU issue voting”, that is they increase the impact of EU attitudes on vote choice (Tillman 2004; 
De Vries 2007; De Vries, Edwards and Tillman 2011). Research has shown that in party systems 
where there is more partisan conflict and media debate on European integration dimensions, EU 
issue voting is more likely (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2009; De Vries et al. 2011). When political 
parties politicize the issue of European integration domestically, there are also greater incentives 
for governing parties to demonstrate that they adjust their position on European integration in 
line with public opinion. Hence, we expect that wherever political party elites increase the 
salience of integration, governments will be particularly prone to signal responsiveness. 
 
H2: Governments are more responsive to public opinion when the European integration issue 
gains salience in domestic party competition. 
  
The next sections discuss how we test these hypotheses empirically. 
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Data and Sample Selection 
To test our propositions we draw on a unique dataset of governments’ votes in the Council 
between January 1999 and October 2011.5 We define opposition as governments’ ‘No’ or 
‘Abstain’ votes, since abstentions always mean a deviation from the majority consensus and 
effectively count as a negative position when mobilizing majorities to meet the required qualified 
majority threshold. Our dependent variable is therefore binary with 1 indicating opposition of 
governments to a legislative act. 
As our main independent variable from hypothesis H1 we measure public opinion on EU 
integration with the Eurobarometer survey question on EU membership, which asks respondents 
whether their countries’ membership in the EU is “a good thing”, “a bad thing”, or “neither good 
nor bad”. This question has been widely used to measure dynamic preferences for EU 
integration. We operationalize public opinion by assigning -1 to all respondents who think EU 
membership is a bad thing, 1 to it is a good thing, and 0 to all who are undecided. Our measure 
of opinion is the survey-weighted mean of all valid responses by country, and runs from about 0 
(when supporters and opponents of integration are neck and neck) to about 0.8 (when there is 
overwhelming support for EU membership).6 In all models we use a 6 month lag of opinion from 
the voting date to represent the causal ordering between opinion and government behavior, in 
which governments react to public opinion.7 
                                               
5
 We use this time frame for the estimation of our voting models that is restricted by the European Commission’s 
decision to discontinue the question on EU membership in the Eurobarometer from 2011 onwards. Our extended 
dataset comprises all votes up to 31st of December 2013. We use this extended dataset for both quantitative text 
models we use in the paper (Wordscores and Latent Dirichlet Allocation). 
6
 We use linear interpolation to cover time points between surveys (see also Soroka and Wlezien 2010). 
7
 In the web appendix, we demonstrate that we obtain the same results with a 1-year lag of public opinion. 
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In order to test our hypothesis H2, we construct a measure of dynamic party salience of 
integration from the Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP) coding of party manifestos 
(Volkens 2013). We capture changes in party emphasis by first calculating the average of the 
logged percentage of quasi-sentences parliamentary parties devote to European integration and 
linearly interpolate this measure between elections over time. Our measure of change in salience 
is the emphasis at the date of the Council vote minus the emphasis two years prior to this date.8 
As signal responsiveness is about “anticipatory representation” rather than a government 
fulfilling its electoral mandate, we have to rule out the possibility that the relationship between 
opinion and opposition votes is entirely driven by changes in government composition – i.e. that 
when parties with a more Euroskeptic profile enter office, they also oppose EU legislation more 
often. We therefore control for the seat-weighted positions on EU integration as well as left-right 
of all government parties that were represented in the cabinet on the very day of the Council 
vote.9 We measure both concepts with the CMP coding from the preceding elections and 
operationalize parties’ position on EU integration as the difference in the percentages of positive 
and negative quasi-sentences on the EU as well as their left-right position captured by the CMP’s 
summative RILE measure. We employ a logit transformation on all CMP measures (Lowe et al. 
2011). Furthermore, we control for several factors that have been shown to influence voting in 
the Council in previous studies. In particular, we control for economic explanations of 
governments’ voting behavior (see Bailer et al. 2014) by including measures of annual 
unemployment, inflation rates and countries’ per capita net balance from the EU budget. Lastly, 
                                               
8 In the web appendix, we provide a graphical example of this measure over time for France. 
9
 Clearly, we expect that more Eurosceptic governments will more often oppose votes in the Council. With regard to 
ideology, we expect center-right governments to oppose EU decisions less often since the center-right has not only 
formed a majority in the Council but also in the agenda-setting Commission during the period under investigation 
(cf. Hagemann and Høyland 2008). 
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we include dummy variables for whether the legislative act was filed under the co-decision 
procedure, whether the country voting held the presidency of the Council as well as whether the 
voting took place before or after Eastern enlargement. These differences in institutional and 
political circumstances could influence the level of opposition.10  
Importantly, we only expect to find signal responsiveness on acts that have implications 
for the scope and level of EU authority. If acts establish EU activities in new areas, set up new 
supranational agencies, or enforce the harmonization of rules, opposing such acts can be 
interpreted by the public as a general stance against ‘more integration’ or more ‘authority’ of the 
supranational institutions. Our expectation is that such legislative acts are strongly clustered in 
particular policy areas. Specifically, policy domains like agriculture and fisheries or internal 
market have been areas of (exclusive) community competence for decades and supranational 
authority in these areas is well-established (see Börzel 2005; Hix 2005; Hix and Hoyland 2011). 
In contrast, in areas where EU competences are not as well-established such as civil liberties, 
justice and home affairs, or foreign policy, the boundaries of authority continue to shift. In order 
to rigorously determine which policy areas are characterized by changes within the boundaries of 
existing competencies as opposed to areas in which legislative activity pushes these boundaries, 
we set up a text scaling model based on the well-known Wordscores approach (Laver, Benoit, 
and Garry 2003).11 For this purpose, we collected text summaries of the legislative acts in our 
dataset from the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory (OEIL) website. These 
summaries of the European Commission’s legislative proposal describe the background, content 
                                               
10
 More details on all variables, their sources and operationalizations are provided in the web appendix. 
11
 Further information on the Wordscores model is provided in the web appendix. 
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as well as implications of the relevant act voted on in the Council. In total, we are able to obtain 
this textual information for 1,793 out of 2,314 acts in our extended dataset.12  
The Wordscores approach takes a starting point in a set of manually chosen reference 
texts that represent the extremes of the substantive dimension of interest. The relative frequency 
of a particular word in each of the reference texts then provides naive Bayes probabilities for 
whether a virgin text is from one or the other reference category. These probabilities are 
multiplied with chosen values for the reference texts in order to ‘score’ each virgin text on the 
dimension of interest. The procedure is applied to each word in a text and the average word-
score of a text provides a document score. We create two long reference texts from our sample 
with negative scores representing acts operating on the basis of established competences and 
positive numbers representing texts that extend EU authority. Table 1 displays average rescaled 
scores of acts per policy area and shows that acts extending EU authority are clearly 
overrepresented in Employment, Education, Culture & Social Affairs as well as Budget, Foreign 
& Security Policy, Transport and Telecommunication and Civil Liberties, Justice & Home 
Affairs. Importantly, the analysis shows that three policy areas are evidently much more 
concerned with established EU competences rather than authority extension, namely Agriculture 
& Fisheries, Economic & Financial Affairs and Internal Market. This classification broadly 
corresponds with the expert judgments provided by Börzel (2005), Hix (2005), and Hix and 
Hoyland (2011) on EU authority across policy areas (see web appendix). In the following we 
therefore exclude these areas from our analysis.    
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                               
12
 Where summaries were not available, this was mainly the case for acts related to specific adjustments of existing 
policies (e.g. extending certain derogations of particular member states) and the EP was not involved procedurally. 
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Analysis and Results 
To analyze these data, we use mixed effects logistic regression models with fixed effects for 
countries and a random effect for each legislative act voted on in the Council, based on the 
assumption that our large sample of acts can be thought of as a random draw from an imagined 
population of Council acts.13  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The main results are reported in Table 2. First, we only include public opinion and the 
control variables in Model 1. The results show that public opinion has a significant effect on 
government’s opposition in the Council in the policy areas included. The probability of an 
opposition vote decreases as the fraction of the population that supports EU membership of their 
country increases. Model 2 adds the governing parties’ seat-weighted position on left-right and 
pro-anti integration to ascertain whether part of the opinion effect is due to changes in the 
government composition. The inclusion of these terms leaves the results virtually unchanged, 
which demonstrates that responsiveness of governments in the Council is first and foremost a 
result of anticipatory dynamics as government parties’ positions at the last elections only explain 
a marginal part of the relationship between opinion and voting in the Council.  Hence, in contrast 
to the existing literature on decision-making in the Council that claims that public opinion is of 
                                               
13
 We implement fixed effects for countries with dummy variables and hence report a constant. We face some 
missing data related to party positions from the CMP. While we use listwise deletion here, the web appendix 
demonstrates that our results are robust to using multiple imputation for these positions. We also present a series of 
further robustness checks in the appendix, including different random and fixed effects specifications, alternative 
operationalizations of opposition votes as well as party salience, different lag lengths of opinion, sensitivity analyses 
with regard to excluding/including policy areas from the sample, and Jackknife resampling at the country level. 
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little significance, we find that if we focus on acts in policy areas that extend the scope and 
degree of EU authority, government opposition is clearly a reflection of domestic 
Euroskepticism. This supports our argument that governments use Council voting to signal 
responsiveness, adjusting their position during the legislative term in anticipation of electoral 
sanctions. 
Model 3 investigates our hypothesis 2 that party salience of EU integration moderates the 
opinion effect on opposition. For this purpose, we include an interaction term between public 
opinion and the increase in party salience of integration during the last two years. The results 
show that when parties have increased the salience of European integration in their manifestos, 
governments are more responsive to different levels of opinion than in situations with decreased 
party salience of integration. The moderation term is highly significant and provides evidence for 
our conjecture that signaling activities of the government are conditioned by domestic party 
competition. 
 The results on the control variables support our expectations. We find that governments 
oppose more often if unemployment is high and if the act was filed under codecision (when 
preference realization is impeded by another veto player, the European Parliament). In contrast, 
the agreement of governments can be ‘bought’ with attributions from the EU budget (see Bailer 
et al. 2014). Also, unsurprisingly national delegations holding the presidency are less likely to 
oppose acts they have negotiated. In Model 3, we also find clear evidence that right-wing 
governments opposed less often during the period under investigation, and that governments that 
present themselves as Euroskeptic in elections oppose more often. 
 Figure 1 demonstrates the substantive magnitude of these results by plotting the 
conditional marginal effect of a unit change in opinion (in terms of changes in predicted 
  
 
 
16 
probabilities) depending on whether party salience of EU integration has increased or decreased. 
These marginal effects range from essentially 0 up to -1.4 percentage points for a unit change in 
opinion. Assuming that party salience of integration is increasing, typical movements in opinion 
within a country (e.g. one or two standard deviations) translate into changes of the predicted 
probability of opposition votes of about +/- 0.1% to 0.3% percentage points. While this may 
appear small at first sight, it must be compared to the overall low frequency of opposition votes 
that is just 1.33% in our sample. In this context, the leverage of public opinion is indeed very 
substantial. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Government Signals  
We have now established that government opposition in the Council is more likely when the 
domestic electorate is more skeptical about the EU, especially when the issue is also gaining 
salience among political parties. The next step is to look at the nature of this opposition and 
whether the government’s signal resonates in the domestic public sphere. 
 Starting with the nature of the public signal, we seek to investigate the kind of issues on 
which governments signal their opposition. For this purpose, we use a topic model that allows us 
to identify the type of acts on which public opinion matters to government opposition. We apply 
a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model (Blei et al. 2003; Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer 2010) to 
the legislative summaries of the 1,793 acts where these summaries were available. LDA is a 
hierarchical Bayesian model that builds on the idea that each document consists of a mixture of 
topics that can be inferred from the co-occurrence of words. The proportions dedicated to each of 
  
 
 
17 
k topics are assumed to be drawn from a common Dirichlet prior. The word generating process 
within each document is then modeled by firstly drawing the topic, and then conditional on the 
topic, the respective word from a multinomial distribution (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013). 
Testing different numbers of topics and starting values we arrive at a model with k = 45 topics 
that creates a good substantive delineation of topics and is indicative of key results we obtain 
across a variety of models.14 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 Table 3 shows the results from the LDA model with 45 topics and each act allocated to 
its most likely topic. It should be noted that these findings are meant to be exploratory, providing 
greater insight into when and why governments choose to oppose, rather than a strict 
confirmatory test. The final column in the table indicates the effect of public opinion on 
government opposition for legislative acts in that category. It displays the difference in the 
percentages of opposition votes given by countries with opinion below versus above the country 
mean. A high positive value shows that a Euroskeptic electorate makes government opposition in 
the Council more frequent, a negative value indicates the opposite (this is only significant in the 
instance of legislation on financial institutions [35]).  
The findings are very much in line with our expectations that signal responsiveness is 
found when legislation is concerned with extending the level and/or scope of European 
integration, rather than in areas of established EU competence. Table 3 shows that public opinion 
has the greatest influence on government opposition on acts concerned with further integration in 
the field of environment, border cooperation and migration, data sharing and harmonization of 
                                               
14
 More details on the LDA model can be found in the web appendix. 
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statistical surveys, as well as in the area of EU funding for member states. In contrast, 
government opposition in the areas of agriculture, fisheries and the internal market is not related 
to public opinion (see the last column, “Difference by opinion”). Hence while we find relatively 
high levels of opposition on acts about agriculture and budget matters, quite possibly related to 
special economic interests (see Bailer et al. 2014), “signal responsiveness” is only apparent when 
national government can use their opposition as a signal that they are standing up for national 
interests by opposing shifts towards further delegation of powers to the EU. The topic model also 
implies that governments use opposition as a signal to domestic audiences mainly in areas that 
are likely to be of greater interest to the general electorate (e.g. border control and environment) 
rather than specialized interests (e.g. agriculture and fisheries). 
 This leads us to the question of whether such “signals” are visible in the domestic public 
spheres. Our argument concerning signal responsiveness rests on the assumption that 
governments have a reasonable expectation that opposition in the Council may come to the 
attention of domestic electorates. If decisions made in the Council are taken entirely “away from 
public scrutiny behind ‘closed doors’”, as Bailer et al. (2014:8-9) argue, then it would be less 
plausible that opposition in the Council is driven by governments’ incentive to improve their 
standing with domestic electorates. Hence, to substantiate our argument, we investigate media 
coverage and subsequent public debate in a number of EU member states to show that Council 
politics is indeed visible to domestic electorates.  
For this purpose, we use data provided by Reh et al. (2013), who collected information on 
the number of news stories in Italian-, German-, French- and English-speaking print media that 
dealt with EU legislative acts adopted under the EU’s codecision procedure from mid-1999 to 
mid-2009 (i.e. for the fifth and sixth European Parliaments). These data cover newspapers from 
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seven different EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the UK). 
To test whether aggregate opposition in the Council is related to higher levels of media coverage, 
we regress the logged average number of newspaper stories regarding an act on the total 
number15 of governmental opposition votes submitted by the seven countries covered in Reh et 
al.’s data using OLS. Since the last section has shown that opposition votes are more common on 
certain topics, we include fixed effects for the 45 topics identified in the LDA model. We find a 
highly significant relationship between the number of opposition votes and media coverage. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the substantive consequences: With no opposition vote an average of 0.4 
newspaper articles cover the act, this number rises to 1 article with two opposition votes, and 1.4 
articles with three governments opposing. Hence, there are observable consequences of 
government responsiveness: opposition is related to higher media coverage of EU legislation, 
even when comparing between acts within the same 45 different topic categories.16 
 
[Figure 2 in here] 
 
To provide a more in-depth look into the public attention to signal responsiveness, we 
have examined the media coverage of cases where a government opposed legislation in the 
Council at a time where the domestic population was particularly critical (with a public opinion 
score below the country mean) and which falls under the topics identified in Table 3. Our 
investigation reveals a number of cases where popular national news outlets report on Council 
                                               
15
 If there was more than one vote occasion, we sum opposition votes across occasions. 
16
 Unfortunately the available media data do not allow us to conduct a test of the relationship between government 
opposition and media attention in the entire EU, however, this analysis is indicative that government opposition in 
the Council resonates in national media. 
  
 
 
20 
agreements and on their government’s opposition on the matter. One example is a media case 
relating to a vote on Environment and Transport (Topic 11). In September 2011, Spain opposed a 
majority in the Council when it voted against an EU directive to substantially increase road tolls 
for heavy vehicles on European motorways.17 Spain - together with the Italian government - 
argued that the new directive would place a disproportionate burden on the EU’s peripheral 
countries, since it would result in a subsequent rise in the costs of export and import of goods. 
The Spanish media reported extensively on the topic, and explicitly mentioned the Spanish 
government’s opposition in the Council.18 The government’s opposition was later also mentioned 
when the national media reported on discussions to extend increased toll taxes to all vehicles 
crossing borders between EU member states.19  
This example illustrates how government opposition in the Council can be picked up by a 
broader public audience beyond the political insiders and narrow organized interest groups with 
a particular incentive to monitor EU legislative activities. Of course, many votes in the various 
Council configurations go largely unnoticed by the general public. Yet, national media pay 
attention to the Council agenda and now seek information on their national governments’ 
positions on individual policies of particular national or regional interest.20  Overall, this 
evidence suggests that opposition in the Council may be as much a political signal to domestic 
audiences as a policy stance vis-à-vis negotiation partners at the European level. 
 
Conclusion 
                                               
17
 Council and European Parliament Directive 2008/0147/COD. 
18
 e.g. La Vanguardia 14/09/2011: “Los camiones pagaran los peajas mas caros”. 
19
 E.g. RTV 16/09/2011:”Cobrar peaje autovias para turismos, un modelo polemico aplicado solo en Portugal”. 
20
 See the Council's press service: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/.  See also European Parliament 2013 
and  www.votewatch.eu/media. 
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The literature on responsiveness has mostly focused on how governments react to public opinion 
in the domestic context, whereas the literature on government behavior in IOs pays little 
attention to the role of national public opinion. The latter generally assumes that governments act 
in isolation from domestic electoral pressures when they cooperate at the international level. 
However, this paper has shown that governments do use the international stage to signal their 
responsiveness to domestic public opinion, and that when they do so, this resonates in the 
domestic public debate. Focusing on the EU’s primary legislative body, the Council of the 
European Union, this paper demonstrates that government opposition to legislative proposals is 
shaped by public opinion on European integration. When the domestic electorate is negatively 
disposed towards the EU, governments are more likely to oppose proposals that aim to extend 
the powers of the EU further. By focusing on legislation that transfers authority to a 
supranational organization - the delegation of power to the EU - we are able to demonstrate the 
effect of public opinion, which has generally been overlooked in analyses that do not make 
distinctions between policy areas or the nature and types of legislation. 
It is important to note that the focus of this study has not been the traditional form of 
policy responsiveness, where governments change policy in response to changing public opinion. 
Instead, we show that governments use the international organizations to signal that they are 
listening to domestic public opinion. We refer to this form of government responsiveness as 
“signal responsiveness” and suggest that it is caused by governments’ incentives to convey their 
policy actions at the EU level to domestic audiences. This distinction is important, because 
unlike policy responsiveness, signal responsiveness has no direct short-term consequences for 
policy output. Hence, while the presence of signal responsiveness indicates that citizens’ views 
are heard, it does not guarantee that they are represented. 
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We also show that government responsiveness is conditioned by domestic party 
competition. When political parties in the domestic arena compete on the issue of European 
integration, governments are more likely to signal their opposition in the Council in response to 
public opinion. Moreover, such actions are seen to shape the public debate: our analysis of media 
coverage shows that when governments oppose in the Council there is also greater coverage in 
the national media. Although this part of the analysis is limited to a subset of EU member states, 
the findings are compelling, and further research should provide a more comprehensive analysis 
of how the domestic public debate and public opinion react to government behavior in the 
Council.  
This study provides an important starting point for understanding the link between 
citizens and their governments in the EU by going beyond the received wisdom that EU 
negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. Our findings point to an electoral connection 
between government ministers and national public opinion in European affairs when it comes to 
decisions on the scope and extent of supranational competences. This may well be relevant to 
other international contexts too. Our expectation was that if we are to find evidence of 
government responsiveness to public opinion in any IO it would be most evident in the EU 
Council. The fact that we find such compelling evidence that governments use their behavior in 
the Council to signal to domestic electorates opens the door to future research into the 
connection between governments and citizens in other international bodies. As incentives 
increase for international cooperation in many spheres of political life, and international 
organizations gain competences to effectively manage such trans-border cooperation, domestic 
electorates are likely to form more explicit opinions and preferences over such international 
engagements. This is accompanied by growing pressures for accountable and transparent 
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decision-making at the international level. Taken together, governments may therefore 
increasingly see an opportunity to signal their responsiveness to domestic constituencies when 
acting in the international arena. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Wordscores results by policy area 
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Policy area Extension of authority vs. 
established competences 
Agriculture and fisheries -.65 
Budget .68 
Civil liberties, justice and home affairs .15 
Constitutional affairs and administration .14 
Development and international trade .12 
Economic and financial affairs -.11 
Employment, education, culture and social .94 
Environment and energy .22 
Foreign and security policy .46 
Internal market and consumer affairs -.03 
Transport and telecommunications .34 
Number of acts 1,793 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mixed effects logistic regression of opposition votes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Public opinion -2.611 -2.527 -2.818 
 
(1.082)** (1.091)** (1.102)** 
Inflation rate 0.060 0.075 0.062 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Unemployment rate 0.097 0.096 0.105 
 
(0.038)** (0.038)** (0.039)*** 
Net balance EU budget -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)** 
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Co-decision 0.788 0.786 0.786 
 
(0.293)*** (0.293)*** (0.293)*** 
Post-enlargement  0.369 0.300 0.171 
 
(0.316) (0.319) (0.320) 
Rotating presidency -1.034 -1.068 -1.380 
 
(0.539)* (0.540)** (0.549)** 
Government EU position  -0.190 -0.366 
  
(0.149) (0.170)** 
Government left-right position  -0.376 -0.440 
  
(0.221)* (0.227)* 
Party salience   4.416 
   
(1.267)*** 
Party salience * Public opinion   -11.971 
   
(3.059)*** 
Constant -6.996 -6.808 -6.852 
 
(0.966)**** (0.997)**** (1.002)**** 
Random effect (legislative act) 2.255 2.257 2.253 
 
(0.215)*** (0.215)*** (0.214)*** 
Fixed effects (countries) Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 17,176 17,176 17,176 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Topic model of Council acts 
 Description Key words Obs. (%) 
Opposition 
votes (%) 
Difference 
by opinion 
(%) 
1 Budgetary surveillance of member states 
Economics,  Budgetary, 
Surveillance, Stability, 
Imbalances, Deficit, Euro 
0.99 0.24 +1.3 
2 Passenger rights and EU funding for disasters  
Transport, Passenger, 
Damage, Disaster, Fund, 
Solidarity 
0.88 5.30 +3.0 
3 Regulation on food products 
Food, Regulation, Label,  
Consumers, Additives, 
Product 
2.91 4.58 -1.1 
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4 Communications and research Programme, Communications, Information 4.12 2.22 +0.8 
5 Crime and justice Criminal, Offence, Judiciary, Crime, Law 3.63 0.35 +0.0 
6 Maritime  Ship, Maritime, Law, Regulation 1.87 1.32 -0.0 
7 Instruments and programmes to financially support non-EU countries 
Instrument, Financial, 
Assistance, Support, Finance, 
Region 
1.81 1.00 +1.3 
8 Agriculture Agriculture, Product, Market, Local, Organic, Trade, Forest 2.25 4.15 -1.1 
9 Companies and financial industry 
Companies, Payment, 
Financial, Transfer, Business, 
Money 
2.09 2.25 +0.9 
10 Energy and environment 
Energy, Efficiency, Emission, 
Gas, Greenhouse, Renewable, 
Fuel 
1.43 0.96 -0.4 
11 Environment and transport 
Emission, Vehicle, Limit, 
Air, Road, Engine, 
Reduction, Pollution, Noise 
2.80 2.80 +3.2*** 
12 Environment  
Substance, Environment, 
Waste, Pollution, Recycling, 
Water 
2.86 2.17 +0.3 
13 Common market in food products 
Market, Aid, Price, 
Regulation, Year, Sugar, 
Product, Quota 
4.56 5.46 -1.1 
14 Health, risk management, culture 
Health, Protect, Threat, 
Emergency, Disease, Risk, 
Culture 
1.04 1.45 +0.1 
15 EU financial assistance 
Assistance, Guarantee, Loan, 
Financial, Fund, European 
Investment Bank 
1.48 0 0 
16 Employment and social policy 
Employment, Social, 
Education, Labour, Training, 
Work 
1.76 1.04 -0.9 
17 Transportation and public works contracts Public, Contract, Air, Carrier, Airport, Transport 1.92 1.16 +0.0 
18 Accession of new member states and 
asylum matters 
Accession, Asylum, 
Application 2.25 1.06 +0.9 
19 Regulation on external trade relations Regulation, Treaties, Trade 3.85 0.74 -0.8 
20 Consumer protection and legal 
enforcement 
Consumer, Protection, Rights, 
Courts, Law, Justice, Legal 1.48 3.07 -0.2 
21 Taxation and internal market VAT, Rate, Tax, Goods, Fraud 2.09 0.24 -0.0 
22 Common Agricultural Policy and rural development 
Agriculture, Rural, Payment, 
Fund, CAP, Regional 1.37 1.35 -1.4 
23 Internal market in energy 
Market, Network, Gas, 
Transmissions, Electricity, 
Energy 
0.82 0.29 -0.6 
24 EU budget 
Budget, Million, Payment, 
Expenditure, Commitment, 
Amount, Financing, 
Resources 
1.54 4.07 +0.2 
25 Animal welfare and disease Animals, Control, Health, Disease, Veterinary, Import 2.97 3.69 +1.7 
26 Customs union  
Customs Union, Duties, 
Import, Tax, Rate, Product, 
Tariff, Excise 
1.48 0.63 -1.2 
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27 Establishment of agencies and networks 
on border control, security and migration 
Agency, Network, 
Establishment, Security, 
Exchange, Border 
2.69 0.81 +1.4*** 
28 Common Agricultural Policy  Farmer, Milk, Payment, Wine, Product, Quota, Market, Crop 1.21 6.38 -2.9 
29 Medicine, chemicals and research Medicine, Substance, Safety, Nuclear, Risk, Chemicals 1.76 2.64 +1.9 
30 Single Market 
Directives, Amendments, 
Requirements, Limits, 
Standards 
2.86 0.90 +0.0 
31 Implementation Implementation, Procedure, Instruments,  Regulatory 2.91 0.07 -0.1 
32 Codification  Codification, Act, Directive, Incorporation, Formal, Law 5.77 0.15 -0.0 
33 Fisheries Fisheries, Vessel, Stock, Conservation, Sea, Catch 4.40 1.44 -0.5 
34 Single currency Euro, Counterfeit, Currency, Adopt, Circulate, Derogation 2.09 0.37 -0.2 
35 Research and technology 
Research, Technology, 
Project, Contribution, 
Financing 
1.37 3.02 +0.1 
36 Financial contributions to member state 
expenditure and to EU funds 
Financial, Fund, Support, 
Assistance, Contribution 2.03 2.98 +2.6* 
37 Import and export of goods 
Export, Import, Product, 
Market, Regulation, Rules, 
Standards 
2.31 2.01 -1.5 
38 Financial institutions Credit, Rate, Risk, Capital, Financial, Institutions, Banks 1.10 1.60 -3.5*** 
39 Communications Communications, Mobile, Satellite, Providers 1.15 3.18 +2.1 
40 EU financing in innovation and infrastructure 
Fund, Innovation, Investment, 
Financing, Infrastructure 1.87 1.54 -1.1 
41 Financial supervision Financial, Supervision, Authority, Bank, ESA 0.66 0 0 
42 Statistical surveys and data sharing  Data, Statistics, Regulation, Quality 3.35 1.16 +1.1** 
43 Transport safety and communications Safety, Railway, Rail, Network, Communications 1.04 4.72 +0.6 
44 Schengen and border control Schengen, Visa, Border, Travel, SIS 3.08 1.34 +0.5 
45 Social security and employment Social security, Citizens, Rights, Profession 2.09 4.43 +1.6 
Note: Column ‘Obs (%)’ shows the fraction of observations allocated to the topic as a percentage of all observations; column 
‘Opposition votes (%)’ shows the fraction of opposition votes as a percentage of the observations in the topic; column 
‘Difference by opinion’ shows difference in the proportions of opposition votes cast with opinion below vs. above the country 
mean; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Party salience and public opinion 
 
 
Note: Change in salience is plotted from the 5th to 95th percentile; 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
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Figure 2: Newspaper stories and opposition votes 
 
 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines. 
 
 
 
 
